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Tackling Intercollegiate Athletics:
An Antitrust Analysis
Self-regulatory associations are private organizations that make rules
and set standards regulating the conduct of their members' activi-
ties. Although they possess a measure of power to force compliance
with their rules and standards, such associations differ from ordinary
business cartels in that a self-regulatory association exercises its regula-
tory power for the benefit of a class broader than its own membership.1
In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,2 the Supreme Court made clear that
anticompetitive conduct occurring outside the usual business context
is not immune from the antitrust laws. The Court's opinion, however,
gave little guidance on the appropriate standard of legality for such
conduct under the antitrust laws.
This Note analyzes the antitrust liability of one self-regulatory
organization, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA). In
doing so, it suggests a model of how the Sherman Act ought to be
applied to similar organizations. Part I of the Note demonstrates that
the NCAA engages in price fixing, market allocation, and group boy-
cotting that would be per se illegal if practiced by ordinary business
competitors. Part II shows that cases since Goldfarb have found that
organizations operating in noncommercial contexts similar to the
NCAA are not subject to the per se rules. While acknowledging the
need for an exception to the per se rules, the Note challenges the form
this exception has taken in the case law. Part III proposes a mode of
analysis that better reconciles the goals of antitrust law with the need
for self-regulation in certain fields and demonstrates how this standard
would work by applying it to several NCAA practices.
1. Ordinary business cartels sometimes serve larger social interests, and self-regulatory
associations sometimes serve the commercial interests of their members. The distinction,
largely one of degree rather than kind, turns on the nature and purpose of the organiza-
tion. See note 96 infra. Some examples of self-regulatory organizations are bar associations,
medical associations, school-accrediting agencies, and amateur athletic associations.
Self-regulatory associations are defined to exclude two types of organizations that have
frequently been scrutinized under the antitrust laws. The first type consists of associations
that engage in the exchange of information among horizontal competitors without at-
tempting to regulate the conduct in which its members engage. See, e.g., United States
v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969); American Column & Lumber Co. v.
United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921). Organizations of the second type do attempt to enforce
rules for the conduct of an activity but operate primarily for the purpose of promoting
the economic welfare of their memberships rather than the welfare of some broader
class. See, e.g., Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957) (professional
sports); Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (trade
association).
2. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 87: 655, 1978
I. The NCAA and Antitrust Analysis in an Ordinary Commercial
Context
A. The NCAA and the Regulation of Intercollegiate Athletics
Prior to the advent of university control of intercollegiate athletics
in the early twentieth century, there was little formal organization of
intercollegiate athletics and control was provided either by alumni or
by students.3 This period was marked by numerous abuses, includng
commercialism, excessive physical injury to student athletes, and
cheating by some participating schools.4 Growing public agitation
about collegiate sports led to the founding of the National Collegiate
Athletic Association in 1905. 5
The NCAA consists of 843 members6 and is recognized as the lead-
ing self-regulatory organization in the field of college athletics. 7 The
NCAA makes policy and enforces rules that govern participation in
intercollegiate athletics by its members.8 The fundamental purpose of
3. For a history of college athletics during this early period, see A. FLATIn, A HISTORY
OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION AND THE AMATEUR
ATHLETIC UNION OF THE UNITED STATES, (1905-1963) 1-21 (1964); H. SAVAGE, AMERICAN
COLLEGE ATHLETICS 13-29 (Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching Bull.
No. 23, 1929).
4. As athletics became increasingly formal the growing costs of athletic participation
were met by charging for admission to football games and by alumni contributions. H.
SAVAGE, supra note 3, at 22-24. With this expansion came abuse. The hiring of "ringers"
(athletes playing in a single game under an assumed name), the presence of "tramp"
athletes ("special students" enrolled in only a single subject), and open recruiting of
athletically gifted students placed intercollegiate athletics in low public esteem. A. FLATH,
supra note 3, at 17-18; H. SAVAGE, supra note 3, at 28-29. Athletic participation, especially
in football, was so dangerous that President Theodore Roosevelt threatened to outlaw
football unless it was reformed. G. HANFORD, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NEED FOR AND
FEASIBILITY OF A NATIONAL STUDY OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS 95 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as ACE STUDY].
5. 2 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON OLYMPIC SPORTS, FINAL REPORT 1975-77, at 332. The
NCAA was originally known as the Intercollegiate Athletic Association and received its
present name in 1910. Id. Ratification of the NCAA's constitution by 38 institutions in
1906 marked the beginning of university control of intercollegiate athletics. A. FLATH,
supra note 3, at 23. But see H. SAVAGE, supra note 3, at 24 (some instances of institu-
tional control before founding of NCAA).
6. [1975-76] NCAA ANN. REP. 12. Figures are cuTent as of December 31, 1976.
7. Cf. 2 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON OLYMPIC SPORTS, supra note 5, at 331 (the 39% of
nation's colleges and universities affiliated with NCAA represent institutions with largest
and best endowed sports programs). The NCAA recently reported assets of $3.7 million,
[1975-76] NCAA ANN. REP. 210, and an operating budget of $3.2 million, id. at 217.
8. The membership, made tip of colleges, regional athletic conferences, and other
interested groups, governs the NCAA through its annual Convention. CONSTITUTION AND
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, art. IV, § 3, re-
printed in [1977-78] MANUAL OF THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION 22-23
[hereinafter cited without parallel citation as NCAA CONST.]. The Convention may pass
bylaws on a majority vote, id. art. VI, § 1(a), and may amend the constitution by a two-
thirds majority vote. Id. art. VII, § 1. The Council, consisting of 18 members elected at
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the NCAA is to preserve distinctively amateur athletics as part of the
academic program of the nation's institutions of higher education. 9
B. The NCAA and Per Se Restraints of Trade
Although the NCAA and its member schools are nonprofit institu-
tions,' 0 both the NCAA n and its members participate in economic
activities largely indistinguishable from the activities of commercial,
profit-seeking competitors.12 NCAA member schools agree to ad-
the Convention, is responsible for the "establishment and direction of the general policy
of the Association" between Conventions. Id. art. V, § 1. The 10-member Executive Com-
mittee implements policies established by the Council. Id. art. V, § 2.
9. The NCAA seeks to maintain a "clear line of demarcation between college athletics
and professional sports" by ensuring that student athletes and the athletic programs in
which they participate remain "an integral part" of the overall educational program. Id.
art. II, § 2(a). The NCAA's other purposes are listed at id. art. II, § 1. The presence of
such programs plays an important, although unquantifiable, role in generating institu-
tional support among students, alumni, and the broader college community. ACE STUDY,
supra note 4, at 116-17. By enforcing the standards of amateurism, of eligibility, and of
university control of sports, the NCAA promotes the use of athletics as a tool to further
the educational and social development of students. See ACE STUDY, supra note 4, at 115.
See also Gardner, The Place of Intercollegiate Athletics in Higher Education: Hold That
Tiger!, 31 J. HIGHER EDuC. 364 (1960).
There is a strong connection between the urge to make an athletic program finan-
cially successful and the urge to "win at all costs." The chances of winning, of course, are
greatly increased by the presence of highly trained athletes. See, e.g., ACE STUDY, supra
note 4, at 53-54, 64, 83; J. DURso, THE SPORTS FACTORY 89 (1975). Fielding a winning team
is also viewed as an important factor in'generating broader institutional prestige that
may aid in institutional fund raising. ACE STUDY, supra note 4, at 54. A "win at all
costs" atmosphere, however, is conducive to a variety of competitive excesses, on the field
and off. See id. at 75. Such excesses can have detrimental effects on the welfare of
students. Marco, The Place of Intercollegiate Athletics in Higher Education: The Respon-
sibility of the Faculty, 31 J. HIGHER EDUc. 422, 426 (1968). See p. 676 & note 106 infra.
10. The NCAA is a nonprofit association. See Hennessey v. National Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n, No. CA 76-P-0799-W, slip op. at I (N.D. Ala. Sept. 27, 1976). Because a school must
be accredited by its regional accrediting agency to be eligibile for NCAA membership,
Bylaws and Interpretations of the National Collegiate Athletic Association, art. VII, § 2
(a)(2), reprinted in [1977-78] MANUAL OF THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION
75 [hereinafter cited without parallel citation as NCAA Bylaws], membership is open only
to nonprofit institutions. See Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n
of Colleges and Secondary Schools, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 459, 461-62 (D.D.C. 1969), rev'd, 432
F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970) (regional accrediting agencies do not
accredit proprietary schools). But see Brief for Appellee at 20, id. (one regional accrediting
agency has accredited three proprietary schools).
11. The Association engages in many commercial activities. It sponsors 39 champion-
ship programs in 18 sports, yielding gross receipts of $6.6 million, [1975-76] NCAA
ANN. REP. 9-10, negotiates contracts for television exposure of some of the events in
which its member schools participate, NCAA, 1976-77 TELEviSION CoMMnITEE REPORT 9,
and performs many of the functions traditionally associated with trade associations such
as publishing and distributing sports books, periodicals, rule books, manuals, and films, per-
forming lobbying functions for its members, arranging insurance packages, and sponsoring
various educational, research, and scholarship programs. See ACE STUDY, supra note 4,
at 85.
12. The motivation for a school's straying from strictly educational objectives is at
least partly financial; a successful intercollegiate football program can provide funds to
help support the rest of a school's intercollegiate and intramural athletic program. In
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minister their athletic programs in accordance with the constitution,
bylaws, and other legislation of the Association. 13 Several of these rules,
as well as the mechanism for enforcing them, suppress significant
economic competition among NCAA members and involve per se
violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 14 If a practice falls within
a per se category, the practice normally is held to violate the antitrust
laws "regardless of any asserted justification or alleged reasonable-
ness."'5
1. Limitations on Student-Athlete Compensation
NCAA members compete for talented student athletes with each
other, nonmember schools, and, to a lesser extent, professional sports
1969 large-scale football programs produced a median of 70% of total athletics revenue but
only 50% of total athletics expenditures-a median profit of $250,000. R. Atwell, Financial
Problems of Intercollegiate Athletics 7 (March 1974) (app. B to ACE STUDY, supra note
4) (on file with Yale Law Journal). In the same year, the average gross revenue from
football was $960,000, with an average operating profit margin of 30.5%. FORBES,
November 15, 1976, at 77. Although basketball is generally a break-even operation, it and
hockey occasionally turn a profit. R. Atwell, supra at 8. As a general proposition, how-
ever, intercollegiate athletic programs appear to lose money. J. DuRso, supra note 9, at
90; Koch, A Troubled Cartel: The NCAA, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 135, 147-48 (1973).
13. NCAA CoNsr., supra note 8, art. IV, § 2(a).
14. This Note's discussion of several NCAA practices, see pp. 658-63 infra, is by no
means an exhaustive catalog of per se violations engaged in by the NCAA and its mem-
bers. The NCAA procedures for certifying events in which NCAA athletes may participate
without losing eligibility may also be a group boycott. See Samara v. National Collegiate
Athletic Ass'n, 1973-1 Trade Cas. ,f 74,536 (E.D. Va. 1973); Note, National Collegiate
Athletic Association's Certification Requirement: A Section 1 Violation of the Sherman
Antitrust Act, 9 VAL. U.L. REV. 193, 205-09 (1974).
NCAA members, albeit without the direct complicity of the Association, engage in a
per se illegal market division when they schedule competition within regional confer-
ences. NCAA member schools compete among themselves to achieve the best possible
athletic schedule. Member schools act in the dual role of buyers and sellers. They act as
sellers when they offer their team's services to other schools; they act as buyers when they
accept offers of team services from other schools. See J. DuRso, supra note 9, at 68-71, 73.
NCAA members have created a horizontal market division by banding into regional con-
ferences, which generally require member schools to play a portion of their games against
other members of the conference, see Koch, supra note 12, at 137-38, and thereby create
geographic competitive boundaries, a per se violation of the Sherman Act. See United
States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United
States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
15. Loevinger, The Rule of Reason in Antitrust Law, 50 VA. L. REV. 23, 26 (1964); see
United States v. Socony-Vacnum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 (1940) (price fixing); Flittie,
The Sherman Act § I Per Se-There Ought To Be a Better Way, 30 Sw. L. REV. 523, 530
(1976) (listing practices labeled per se violations). A literal reading of § I would eliminate
the right to contract, since all contracts necessarily restrain trade, see, e.g., Standard Oil
Co. (N.J.) v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight
Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 355 (1897) (White, J., dissenting), so the Supreme Court has held that
§ I prohibits only unreasonable restraints of trade. Nevertheless, the Court has long held
that certain types of contracts are irrebuttably presumed unreasonable and are thts per
se in violation of § 1. See Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price
Fixing and Market Division (pt. 1), 74 YALE L.J. 775, 785-805 (1965).
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teams. 0 Because the supply of talented athletes is limited, competition
for their services is sometimes intense. 17 NCAA rules restrain this
competition by placing limits on the compensation received by student
athletes who participate in Association events.' 8 Member schools are
prohibited from providing more than "commonly accepted educa-
tional expenses": tuition and fees, room and board, and a few in-
cidentals.' 9 The number2 and duration 2' of athletic financial aid
awards are also limited by NCAA rules.
Compensation paid to student athletes is, in economic terms, the
price of their athletic services. 22 Because the price is set by agreement
16. NCAA members have occasionally met competition from professional teams in
their efforts to recruit high school players. J. DuRSo, supra note 9, at 27-30 (professional
team reportedly signed seven-year, 83 million contract with athlete directly after high
school graduation). Furthermore, professional teams sometimes draw seasoned players
away from college teams before graduation. Id. at 81-86; see Denver Rockets v. All-Pro
Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1055 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (striking down professional
league's rule prohibiting contracts with college-age players).
17. It is estimated that only four percent of the average "big-time" athletic budget is
spent on recruitment, R. Atwell, supra note 12, at 10, but this figure fails to reveal the
intensity of athletic recruitment. See J. Duaso, supra note 9, at 34 (high school basketball
star received recruiting letters from 200 schools). Although NCAA member schools have
eliminated price competition for athletic services, almost every imaginable form of in-
fluence is used to persuade young athletes to attend a given school. Airplanes, a staff of
assistant coaches who are primarily recruiters, recruiting trips, expense-paid campus
visits, and visits from celebrated alumni are all part of recruiting. See generally K.
DENLINGER & L. SHAPIRO, ATHLEM FOR SALE (1975); J. DuRso, supra note 9. Although the
amount of actual cheating' is unknown, scandals are occasionally uncovered and rumors
of widespread cheating abound. See K. DENLINGER & L. SHAPIRO, supra at 202-16; J. Duaso,
supra note 9, at 64-74.
18. NCAA CONST., sulpra note 8, art. III, § 1(a)(3).
19. Id. § l(g)(l). Students may receive a maximum of four complimentary tickets to a
game in which they are participants, id. § l(g)(3), travel, insurance, and tutorial expenses
in connection with intercollegiate participation, id. § 1(h), and achievement awards of
small value, id. § l(i). Division III, composed of schools with weaker athletic programs,
may award financial aid to student athletes only upon a showing of financial need.
NCAA Bylaws, supra note 10, art. IX, § 2(b).
20. NCAA Bylaws, supra note 10, art. V, § 5 (setting maximum number of financial aid
awards in each sport).
21. The duration of an athletic grant may not exceed one year if athletic ability was
a basis in making the award, NCAA CONST., supra note 8, art. III § 4(d), and the number
of years that a student may engage in intercollegiate athletics is limited. NCAA Bylaws,
supra note 8, art. IV, § 3(c). These limitations prevent student athletes from bargaining
for longer awards.
22. Although colleges euphemistically label this compensation "financial aid," there
can be no question that this aid is, in fact, compensation: student-athletes exchange their
athletic skills, in a quid pro quo, for a package of goods and services. Although the
athletic award may not be adjusted during the award's period on the basis of the student's
athletic ability, a disabling injury, or any other athletic reason, the award may be
graduated or cancelled if the student is declared ineligible for intercollegiate competition,
engages in fraud or serious misconduct, or withdraws from a sport for personal reasons.
NCAA CoNsr., supra note 8, art. III, § 4(c). Furthermore, if an athlete is injured or fails to
perform well athletically, his grant need not be renewed for the next period. NCAA,
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among member schools rather than by competition, NCAA rules
limiting compensation constitute price fixing among horizontal com-
petitors in the market for athletic services. 23 These price-fixing agree-
ments are per se violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
2 4
2. Restrictions on the Number of Coaches
NCAA members also compete for the services of coaches and assis-
tants qualified to train and manage varsity teams.25 NCAA rules re-
strict competition for coaching services by limiting the number of
coaches and assistant coaches any member school may hire for its
basketball and football teams.26 This rule is an agreement to limit
supply and contains features of both horizontal market division and
price fixing 2 7 It is thus a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman
CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS CASE BOOK OF THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION,
No. 107, reprinted in [1977-78] MANUAL OF THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIA-
TION 176-77.
23. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 222 (1940) (price fixing
occurs "if the range within which purchases or sales will be made is agreed upon"). The
costly extremes to which college coaches have gone to lure some high school athletes are
an indication that member schools may be willing to offer compensation in excess of
NCAA limits to at least certain athletes. See note 17 supra.
24. See United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 491 (1950)
(price fixing consistently condemned for services as well as goods); Mandeville Island
Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 235 (1948) (agreements by
buyers as well as sellers to fix prices are per se illegal).
25. The employment market for collegiate coaches has been described as "multi-state,
if not national." Hennessey v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, No. CA 76-P-0799-W,
slip op. at 19 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 27, 1976).
26. This limit has only been adopted by schools in the NCAA's Division I, which
consists of schools having the strongest athletic programs. NCAA Bylaws, supra note 10,
art. VI, § 1. See id. art. XI, § 1(a) (NCAA divided into three divisions, each having separate
legislative power).
27. A horizontal market division is an agreement among competitors to divide the
market in which they purchase or sell goods or services. The division can be along
geographic, customer, or product lines. The effect of such an agreement is to create
protected market segments. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972)
(cooperative buying association exclusive licensing scheme); Timken Roller Bearing Co.
v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951) (division of world into exclusive territories).
The limitation on hiring coaches is a horizontal market division because it divides the
supply of coaching jobs equally among horizontal competitors. Moreover, the limitation
is also a type of indirect price fixing that usually falls within the per se ban. Cf. Na-
tional Macaroni Mfrs. v. FTC, 345 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1965) (uniform standards for purchas-
ing raw materials by competing manufacturers). An agreement that, by restricting the num-
ber of purchases, accomplishes the same result as a direct agreement among competing
purchasers to fix the price of purchased goods or services must also be per se illegal. Cf.
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (horizontal agreements to
restrict output are per se illegal). The NCAA limit on the number of coaches will depress
coaches' salaries because the number of coaches employed under the rule is less than the
number employed before its adoption. See Hennessey v. National Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n, No. CA 76-P-0799-W, slip op. at 24 & n.21 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 27, 1976) (number of dis-
placed coaches "not insignificant").
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Act.28 Furthermore, compliance with the rule may take on some of the
characteristics of a concerted refusal to deal, another per se violation.29
3. The NCAA Television Plan
NCAA member schools are competitors in the marketing of broad-
casting rights"0 and compete with other forms of public entertain-
ment.3' The NCAA controls all forms of simultaneous telecasting of
28. See Hennessey v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, No. CA 76-P-0799-W, slip op.
at 20 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 27, 1976) (limitation on coaches is horizontal market division and is
normally per se violation). See note 27 supra (citing cases).
29. Concerted refusals to deal, or group boycotts, are agreements by traders not to do
business with other traders and are per se violations of Sherman Act § 1. See, e.g., Klor's,
Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959) (excluding competitors from
marketplace); Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 467-68
(1941) (coercing conduct of buyers, sellers, or competitors). See generally Barber, Refusals
to Deal Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 847 (1955).
The NCAA's limitation on coaches contains some of the features of a group boycott.
Since there were more coaches employed than the rule permitted, a number of coaches
lost their jobs as a result of the rule. See note 27 supra. Because all Division I schools are
bound to follow the rule, these coaches were faced with a refusal to deal based on the
concerted action of the NCAA members; thus some coaches were unable to sell their
labor "in an open competitive market." See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.,
359 U.S. 207, 213 (1959). But see Hennessey v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, No.
CA 76-P-0799-W, slip op. at 19-20 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 27, 1976) (group boycott cases require
boycott of specific target group because of some characteristic of target group members;
NCAA rule had no such effect). Recently, some lower courts have departed from strict
per se analysis by requiring proof of exclusionary or coercive intent. See, e.g., Oreck Corp.
v. Whirlpool Corp., 563 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1977); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian
Oke Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970).
30. For a description of the NCAA television plan, see Hochberg & Horowitz, Broad-
casting and CATV: The Beauty and the Bane of Major College Football, 38 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 112 (1973). Precise measurement of the extent of the competition for broad-
casting rights requires a factual inquiry into the nature of relevant product and geographic
markets. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 324 (1962); United States v. E.I.
DuPont De Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956). Moreover, it is extremely difficult to
measure the extent of this competition because actual competition has been eliminated by
the NCAA television plan, see p. 662 infra, and by the federal government. See 15
U.S.C. §§ 1291-1294 (1970) (antitrust exemption for television pooling agreements by
professional sports teams not available for Saturday broadcasts). Competition in the sale
of broadcasting rights would exist but for these artificial restraints.
The NCAA plan provides for "exception" telecasts under certain specified circumstances
where the telecast will not appreciably damage attendance at a concurrent college game.
NCAA, 1976-77 TELEVISION Cormrnrr REPORT 19-25. The fact that there were 43 excep-
tion broadcasts in 1976, id. at 41, suggests that there is unsatisfied demand for telecasts,
thus indicating that the NCAA plan is restricting output in the sale of television rights.
Furthermore, several schools have indicated that they could receive far more for their
television rights in an open market. See Koch, supra note 12, at 146-47. There have been
indications that the stronger football schools might break away and compete with the
NCAA in marketing broadcast rights. See id. at 147.
31. Intercollegiate athletics is a form of public entertainment. College football at-
tendance in 1975 was 31.7 million. FORBES, November 15, 1976, at 77. For the 1968-69 season
the NCAA estimated that football generated $145 million in revenues and that all sports
generated '200 million. A strong athletic program may produce as much as $5 million in
gross revenues for a school. Id. Although a precise determination of the extent to which
intercollegiate sports compete with other forms of entertainment is beyond the scope of
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football games between NCAA member schools and thereby restricts
member schools in their direct dealings with broadcasters. 32 The NCAA
periodically sells an exclusive right to televise NCAA football to a
single television network.33 In return for a guaranteed total fee, the
NCAA receives from the network a contract specifying the total num-
ber of televised "exposures" per season, the minimum and maximum
number of appearances each member school must receive, and the
criteria for broadcasting additional games as exception telecasts.34 The
NCAA football television plan is an agreement among horizontal com-
petitors to limit output, and hence a per se violation of the Sherman
Act,35 because it restricts the amount of college football available for
home viewings.30
4. The NCAA Enforcement Program
The NCAA Enforcement Program imposes sanctions on violators of
the Association's rules. A member school found guilty of a violation
after notice and hearing can be penalized by being excluded from
specified NCAA events such as NCAA championships, post-season
meets, or even regular season play.37 Violation of NCAA rules can also
lead to exclusion from the NCAA television plan.38 Although the
this Note, two facts indicate that this competition exists. First, intercollegiate sports
thrive best in areas removed from the broad cultural alternatives provided by large cities.
Second, few large cities have been able to maintain a "big-time" college football program
over a long time span when faced with competition from professional teams. J. MICHENER,
SPORTS IN AMERICA 208-09 (1976).
32. The network selects the football games to be telecast and must negotiate separate
contracts with individual schools. The individual contracts are subject to the terms of
the NCAA package contract. NCAA, supra note 30, at 9. Despite this provision for in-
dividual negotiation, the fees paid to schools appearing on television are uniform. Id. at 7
($501,538 for national appearance, $380,000 for regional appearance, subject to six percent
assessment by NCAA).
33. Before 1951 NCAA member schools negotiated television contracts individually. See
Hochberg & Horowitz, supra note 30, at 112, 114. The current policy of using two-year
contracts was adopted in 1960. Id. at 116.
34. See NCAA, supra note 30, at 7-13, 17. An exposure is defined as the "release of a
game telecast or a combination of several game telecasts into each television market in
the nation." Id. at 10.
35. An agreement by competitors to limit their output, production, or sales is
equivalent to a direct agreement to fix prices. If competitors restrict output, prices will
rise. See generally R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 195-209 (2d ed. 1977). The
NCAA television plan, by restricting sales of television broadcast rights, constitutes an
agreement to limit the sales of such rights. Horizontal agreements to restrict output are
per se illegal as a corollary of the per se ban on price fixing. United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
36. Hochberg & Horowitz, supra note 30, at 112. See note 30 supra.
37. NCAA, OFFICIAL PROCEDURE GOVERNING THE NCAA ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM § 7(b),
reprinted in [1977-78] MANUAL OF THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION 124.
38. Id.
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NCAA has no authority to discipline individual athletes for violation
of NCAA eligibility rules, the Association may force a member school
to discipline an individual athlete by threatening to sanction the
school. 39 These sanctions, or the threat of their imposition, ordinarily
succeed in securing compliance with NCAA rules.40 The NCAA En-
forcement Program is therefore an economic boycott or concerted re-
fusal to deal, another per se violation.
41
II. The NCAA and Recent Antitrust Analysis
A. Goldfarb
Until recently, accepted judicial doctrines of immunity shielded
self-regulatory organizations42 from antitrust scrutiny. Immunity was
justified by the alternative theories that self-regulatory organizations
do not engage in "trade or commerce" 43 or that the antitrust laws do
39. See NCAA CoNs?., supra note 8, art. IV, § 6; Howard Univ. v. National Collegiate
Athletic Ass'n, 510 F.2d 213, 215 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (all sanctions passed by NCAA imposed
on member schools).
40. It is impossible to measure how much cheating occurs. See ACE STUDY, supra
note 4, at 80-82. The Enforcement Program is designed to promote voluntary self-dis-
closure and self-correction of NCAA rule violations. See NCAA, OFFICIAL PROCEDURE
GOVERNING THE NCAA ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMIS §§ 3(b), 7(b)(12), (e), reprinted in [1977-78]
MANUAL OF THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC AsSOCIATION 122, 125-26. Review of the
minutes of the NCAA Council and Executive Committee reveals that universities charged
with violations often cooperate with the NCAA investigative staff.
41. See note 29 supra (citing cases).
42. See p. 655 & note I supra (self-regulatory organization controls activity for benefit
of class broader than class subject to regulation).
43. The "trade or commerce" doctrine is based on the argument that Congress did
not intend to exercise its full power under the commerce clause. The argument that the
words "trade or commerce" mean something less than interstate commerce is founded on
a misreading of the Federal Baseball case. Federal Baseball Club, Inc. v. National League
of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). Justice Holmes wrote that a baseball
exhibition "although made for money would not be called trade or commerce in the com-
monly accepted use of those words," id. at 209; but he was merely ruling that baseball
was not interstate commerce as that term was defined in his era-a definition that re-
quired courts to ask whether an activity was "commerce" and whether it was sufficiently
"interstate." See United States v. International Boxing Club, Inc., 348 U.S. 236, 243
(1955). As the definition of interstate commerce has expanded, the scope of the Sherman
Act has also expanded. Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 743
n.2 (1976) ("decisions by [the Supreme] Court have permitted the reach of the Sherman
Act to expand along with expanding notions of congressional power"). There is language
in other cases that might indicate that "trade or commerce" is narrower than the full
scope of the commerce power, See, e.g., United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate
Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 490-92 (1950) (reserving question whether professional activity con-
stitutes trade or commerce); Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427,
436-37 (1932) ("trade" as used in Sherman Act does not include liberal arts or learned
professions). But "[t]hese citations are to passing references in cases concerned with other
issues." Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 786 n.15 (1975). The language of § I
of the Sherman Act was intended to merge constitutional jurisdiction with the common
law terminology "restraint of trade." See Note, The Applicability of the Sherman Act to
Legal Practice and Other "Non-commercial" Activities, 82 YALE L.J. 313, 321-22 (1972).
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not apply to organizations whose activities are "traditionally non-
commercial."4 4 According to these doctrines, the Sherman Act was
simply not intended to apply to self-regulatory organizations like the
NCAA. 4
5
In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,46 however, the Supreme Court
overturned accepted notions of antitrust immunity.47 In holding price
fixing by a bar association illegal under the Sherman Act, the Court
ruled that professional self-regulatory organizations are subject to
antitrust scrutiny. The Court held that "[t]he nature of an occupa-
tion, standing alone, does not provide sanctuary from the Sherman
Act" where anticompetitive activities or practices are alleged.48 Anti-
competitive behavior is subject to antitrust review under Goldfarb
regardless of the context in which it occurs.
49
44. The "traditionally noncommercial" doctrine originated in Marjorie Webster Junior
College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges and Secondary Schools, Inc., 432 F.2d 650
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970), and is thus of more recent vintage than the
"trade or commerce" doctrine. Judge Bazelon, in holding that a regional school accrediting
association was beyond the scope of the Sherman Act, drew a distinction between ordinary
commercial enterprises and combinations normally having other than commercial ob-
jectives. Id. at 654. In the latter context, an "incidental restraint of trade, absent an in-
tent or purpose to affect the commercial aspects of the profession, is not sufficient to
warrant application of the antitrust laws." Id. The court intended to create only a
partial immunity; antitrust policy was to apply to activities "that could have little other
than a commercial motive." Id. The court did not cite any legislative history to support
the notion that the context in which a restraint of trade arises may render the Sherman
Act inapplicable, nor do the cases that the court cited as support for this proposition
buttress such a view. See Note, supra note 43, at 325-27.
45. Courts have used the "traditionally noncommercial" theory to immunize the NCAA
from Sherman Act review. See Jones v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 392 F. Supp.
295, 303 (D. Mass. 1975) (motion for preliminary injunction; alternative grounds); College
Athletic Placement Serv. v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 1975-1 Trade Cas. 1f 60,117,
at 65,267 (D.N.J.), aff'd nene., 506 F.2d 1050 (3d Cir. 1974); cf. Amateur Softball Ass'n v.
United States, 467 F.2d 312, 315 (10th Cir. 1972) (reserving question whether "trade or
commerce" exemption applies to amateur athletics).
46. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
47. The Court rejected the "trade or commerce" doctrine because it could not "find
support for the proposition that Congress intended any such sweeping exclusion." Id. at
787. Furthermore, in rejecting the notion that the nature of the occupation served to
shield anticompetitive activities from antitrust liability, the Court implicitly rejected the
"traditionally noncommercial" doctrine. Id. at 787-88. The Court did leave open, however,
the possibility that the nature of the occupation could play a role in evaluating anti-
competitive practices. See id. at 788 n.17.
48. 421 U.S. at 787.
49. "[T]he Sherman Act . . . 'shows a carefully studied attempt to bring within the
Act every person engaged in business whose activities might restrain or monopolize com-
mercial intercourse among the states.'" 421 U.S. at 788 (quoting United States v. South-
Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 553 (1944)). Two post-Goldfarb opinions sug-
gest that the immunity argument retains some force; neither of the cases, however, cites
authority for this proposition or attempts to analyze the limits of the Goldfarb holding.
Donnelly v. Boston College, 558 F.2d 634, 635 (1st Cir. 1977) (dictum) ("defendants' law
school activities do not have 'commercial objectives'"); In re Bates, 555 P.2d 640, 642
(Ariz. 1976), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Bates v. State Bar, 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977) (Gold.
farb limited to restraints traditionally targets of antitrust laws; advertising "far different
than price-fixing").
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After Goldfarb the NCAA's anticompetitive practices are susceptible
to antitrust attack,"° but the NCAA's status as a self-regulatory organi-
zation may require that its practices be tested under relaxed antitrust
standards. Although the Court in Goldfarb rejected the argument that
a restraint arising in a noncommercial context is immune from anti-
trust review, the Goldfarb opinion intimated that less stringent rules
would be applied to such restraints.51 The Court noted that the
"public service" aspects of a restraint "may require that a particular
practice, which could properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman
Act in another context, be treated differently."
' 52
Goldfarb thus suggests that the nature of the organization engaged
in a questionable practice may justify a relaxation of the per se rules.
The decision to declare a given practice per se illegal rests upon two
criteria. First, in all but a small percentage of cases, the anticompetitive
harms of the practice outweigh any possible benefits.53 Second, any
judicial attempt to identify cases in which the practice is not on
balance harmful will waste judicial resources and add costly elements
of uncertainty to the law.54 A per se rule therefore reflects the judg-
ment that it is not worthwhile to make individual determinations of
reasonableness.55
It is doubtful that the criteria for proper application of per se rules
are met in the context of self-regulation since, by definition, self-
regulatory organizations are substantially interested in benefiting a
50. Since Goldfarb at least two courts have relied on that case to hold that the NCAA
is not immune from antitrust scrutiny. Hennessey v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n,
No. CA 76-P-0799-W, slip op. at 14-16 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 27, 1976) (specifically refusing to
distinguish NCAA from bar association); Board of Regents v. National Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n, 561 P.2d 499 (Okla. 1977) (construing Oklahoma statute with language similar to
Sherman Act § 1).
51. 421 U.S. at 788 n.17.
52. Id.
53. The practice is judged to have such a "pernicious effect on competition" and such
a "lack of any redeeming virtue" that it will nearly always cause an unreasonable restraint
of trade. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). The Court has
cited this language with approval several times during the last 20 years. E.g., Continental
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 97 S. Ct. 2549, 2558 (1977); United States v. Topco Assocs.,
Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607 (1972). See Elman, "Petrified Opinions" and Competitive Realities,
66 COLUM. L. REv. 625, 626-27 (1966).
54. Certainty of legal rules helps to reduce the costs of compliance with that rule. See
Ehrlich & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 262-
67 (1974). The "bright line" prohibitions inherent in per se rules are especially valuable
in the antitrust field because the law must be explained to corporate personnel, who
usually lack legal training. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 97 S. Ct. 2549,
2558 n.16 (1977). Per se rules are a means of reducing the complexity that plagues antitrust
litigation; they also reflect an awareness that courts are not well-suited to make complex
economic judgments. See Jacobi v. Bache & Co., 520 F.2d 1231, 1238 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1053 (1976); Flittie, supra note 15, at 548-52.
55. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); see note 53 supra.
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class beyond the regulated group.56 Indeed, application of per se rules
without regard to the context in which an alleged restraint occurs
would seriously impede much legitimate and publicly desired activity. 7
In the case of the NCAA, the very activities that would be prohibited
now serve essential functions in regulating intercollegiate athletics. 8
Application of per se rules would prohibit self-regulatory organizations
from raising these issues since reasonableness is no defense to a per se
violation. 59
B. After Goldfarb
Lower courts have not ignored the caveat in the Goldfarb opinion;60
they have been reluctant to apply per se rules to anticompetitive
restraints engaged in by self-regulatory organizations.6' The courts
have deviated from the per se rules in two ways. First, some courts have
used the rule of reason standard to examine self-regulatory activities
that would be per se illegal in an ordinary commercial setting.62 These
courts look first to the nature of the organization, and, on finding that
a self-regulatory organization is involved, apply rule of reason analysis
to the activity or practice. Other courts, after finding themselves out-
side an ordinary commercial setting, have created an irrebuttable
presumption of reasonableness if a threshold inquiry into the nature,
56. See p. 655 & note I supra.
57. The Supreme Court does not place a given practice in the per se category until it
has gained experience with the practice. See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania
Inc., 97 S. Ct. 2549, 2558 (1977); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963).
By analogy, extension of the per se rules to the self-regulatory context should await
further judicial experience with self-regulatory practices. Cf. Mackey v. National Football
League, 543 F.2d 606, 619 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 98 S. Ct. 28 (1977) (professional
football).
58. For example, if student athletes are to remain both students and athletes, standards
to regulate their amateur standing must be adopted. These standards will inevitably limit
the compensation received by a student athlete. Even if the NCAA were to adopt financial
need as the sole criterion for rewarding athletic scholarships, it would be guilty of price
fixing by setting the price at zero. See pp. 658-60 supra. Division III of the NCAA has
already taken this step. NCAA Bylaws, supra note 10, art. IX, § 2. Similarly, NCAA rules
governing intercollegiate athletics must be enforced. Like other private organizations, the
primary sanction available to the NCAA is exclusion of the violator from some or all of
its activities. Because NCAA activities produce revenue for member schools, imposition of
this sanction would take the form of an economic boycott, See pp. 662-63 supra.
59. See note 15 supra.
60. See p. 665 supra.
61. See, e.g., Veizaga v. National Bd. for Respiratory Therapy, 1977-1 Trade Cas.
1 61,274 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (physical therapists); Hennessey v. National Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n, No. CA 76-P-0799-W (N.D. Ala. Sept. 27, 1976) (collegiate sports). But see note 101
infra.
62. Hennessey v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, No. CA 76-P-0799-W (N.D. Ala.
Sept. 27, 1976); Board of Regents v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 561 P.2d 499 (Okla.
1977) (construing Oklahoma statute with language similar to Sherman Act § 1). See
pp. 667-68 infra.
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purpose, and character of the particular challenged practice reveals
that specific practice to be noncommercial.63 Although both of these
approaches recognize Goldfarb's suggestion that the context in which
a restraint arises may influence the applicable antitrust standards,
neither approach successfully harmonizes the goals of antitrust law
with the requirements of self-regulatory organizations like the NCAA.
1. The Rule of Reason in the Self-Regulatory Context
Under the first approach, when faced with conduct that would be
per se illegal in an ordinary commercial context, the court examines
the conduct under the rule of reason without clearly articulating the
circumstances, if any, in which it would apply per se rules to self-
regulatory organizations. The courts make a determination that the
context of the organization, as opposed to the particular practice, justi-
fies the relaxed standard. 64 Hennessey v. National Collegiate Athletic
Association15 illustrates this approach. The plaintiffs were reduced in
status from full-time to part-time coaches at the University of Alabama
when the NCAA adopted its rule limiting the number of coaches. 66
Despite finding a restraint that would normally be classified per se
illegal,67 the court found that the nature and purposes of the NCAA
justified review under the rule of reason. 6 The NCAA rule was found
to be a reasonable restraint of trade.69
63. Boddicker v. Arizona State Dental Ass'n, 549 F.2d 626, 632 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
98 S. Ct. 73 (1977) ("to survive a Sherman Act challenge a particular practice, rule, or
regulation . . . must serve the purpose for which the profession exists, viz. to serve the
public"); Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, 415 F. Supp. 1258 (N.D.
Fla. 1976). The opinions, however, are not entirely clear about whether a practice would
be conclusively held reasonable if both commercial and noncommercial elements are
present. See p. 671 infra.
64. See Hennessey v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, No. CA 76-P-0799-W, slip. op.
at 20-21 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 27, 1976).
65. Id., noted at 7 Cum. L. Rav. 505 (1977).
66. Id., slip op. at I. The NCAA rule limiting the number of coaches is discussed at
pp. 660-61 supra.
67. Although the plaintiffs argued that the rule constituted a group boycott, see note
29 supra, the court thought the coach limitation "more clearly analogous to a 'division of
markets'." No. CA 76-P-0799-W, slip op. at 19-20. See note 27 supra.
68. No. CA 76-P-0799-W, slip op. at 20-21. The court did not name the precise features
of the NCAA that justified relaxing antitrust standards.
69. Id., slip op. at 25. This approach was taken in another case challenging the NCAA
coach limitations. See Board of Regents v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 561 P.2d
499 (Okla. 1977) (construing Oklahoma statute with language similar to Sherman Act § 1).
Although professional sports leagues are not self-regulatory organizations within the
scope of this Note, see note I supra, and were not immune from the Sherman Act before
Goldfarb, see Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957), this approach
has also been taken when examining the practices of the National Football League. See
Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 98 S. Ct.
28 (1977). But see Smith v. Pro-Football, 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976).
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Use of the rule of reason to examine self-regulatory conduct is a
questionable exercise of judicial power. A rule of reason inquiry is
usually limited to the effect of conduct on economic competition.70
When courts undertake to balance the social benefits of self-regulatory
conduct against the economic harm such conduct produces, they cannot
avoid making decisions according to "some ultimate reckoning of
social or economic debits and credits." 7' 1 Such a broad balancing of
social values should not be undertaken in the absence of better
guidance from Congress.72 If courts attempt to avoid this problem by
ignoring the broader public interest questions likely to be raised by
self-regulatory organizations, they must ignore the Supreme Court's
caveat in Goldfarb.73 Thus the courts cannot entirely avoid making
broad economic and social decisions in these circumstances.7 4 But the
rule of reason approach offers little, if any, guidance for the exercise
of broad judicial discretion.
2. Distinguishing Commercial and Noncommercial Practices in a
Self-Regulatory Context
Under the second approach, when faced with a practice that would
be per se illegal in an ordinary commercial context, the court makes a
threshold inquiry designed to separate commercial from noncom-
mercial practices. 7; Thus the court focuses on the specific practice
70. "iT]he standard of reason ... was intended to be the measure used for the pur-
pose of determining whether in a given case a particular act had or had not brought about
the wrong against which the statute provided." Standard Oil Co. (N.J.) v. United States, 221
U.S. 1, 60 (1911). The wrongs that the statute sought to prevent were the power to fix
prices and limit output and deterioration in quality of monopolized goods. Id. at 52. See
Loevinger, supra note 15, at 33-34. Courts have occasionally referred to broader social
values. See Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 241 (1918) (restrictions
on length of working day).
71. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371 (1963).
72. See id.; United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 196 (1963); Bork, supra note
15, at 838-39; Loevinger, supra note 15, at 34. The state legislatures can also provide
guidance to the courts by enacting laws that eliminate competitive aspects of an activity,
which creates a state action immunity. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
73. See p. 665 supra.
74. Unless they adopt per se rules, courts must make these choices either explicitly,
through the adoption of the rule of reason approach, or implicitly, through the adoption
of a presumption of validity. See p. 669 infra.
75. Courts have emphasized different factors in deciding whether a self-regulatory
practice is commercial or noncommercial. Two general approaches can be discerned in
the case law. Some courts focus primarily on the defendant's intent and purpose. See
Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, 415 F. Supp. 1258, 1263 (N.D. Fla.
1976). Other courts focus on the nature and character of the practice. See Veizaga v.
National Bd. for Respiratory Therapy, 1977-1 Trade Cas. f, 61,274, at 70,870 (N.D. Ill.
1977). One court has combined elements of both the purpose test and the nature and
character test. See Boddicker v. Arizona State Dental Ass'n, 549 F.2d 626, 632 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 73 (1977) (examining whether "a particular practice, rule, or regula-
tion of a profession" actually "serve[s] the purpose for which the profession exists").
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rather than the self-regulatory status of the defendant organization."
If the restraint is found to be commercial, a per se prohibition is
applied. The per se rule is not applied, however, to practices found to
be noncommercial. Noncommercial practices are conclusively presumed
to be reasonable and, therefore, legal. 77 Feminist Women's Health
Center, Inc. v. Mohammad78 illustrates this approach. The plaintiff
abortion clinic alleged that the defendant physicians had conspired to
withhold hospital privileges from physicians associated with the plain-
tiff in order to drive it out of business. Although agreeing that this
was an allegation of a per se illegal group boycott,7 9 the court ruled
that if the defendants could show a reasonable noncommercial motiva-
tion, their conduct would be deemed reasonable under the Sherman
Act. 0
It is questionable that the commercial/noncommercial threshold in-
quiry is a workable legal standard. First, this inquiry in practice will
require a complex and detailed factual investigation, whether the court
relies on the motivation of the regulators or on the "nature or char-
acter" of the practice to separate commercial and noncommercial prac-
76. The court first finds that the defendant is generally engaged in self-regulatory
activity and then moves on to determine whether the particular challenged practice is
commercial or noncommercial. See Feminist Women's Health Center v. Mohammad, 415
F. Supp. 1258, 1263 (N.D. Fla. 1976).
77. One case adopts the commercial/noncommercial threshold test but uses a finding
that a practice is noncommercial to trigger full rule of reason review rather than a con-
clusive presumption of reasonableness. Veizaga v. National Bd. for Respiratory Therapy,
1977-1 Trade Cas. 61,274, at 70,870 (N.D. 111. 1977). Plaintiffs, in a class action, argued
that the defendant agency's testing and certification procedure and the defendant hospitals'
refusal to hire uncertified therapists constituted a per se illegal group boycott. The court
demanded an initial inquiry into whether the challenged activity was, "by its nature and
character, commercial." Id. The court ruled that it would apply a per se rule only upon
finding that the restraint was commercial and would apply the rule of reason if the
restraint was noncommercial. Id. Veizaga thus represents a hybrid of the approach taken
in Hennessey, see p. 667 supra, and the commercial/noncommercial threshold inquiry, be-
cause it uses the threshold inquiry to limit the occasions in which it will use rule of reason
analysis.
78. 415 F. Supp. 1258 (N.D. Fla. 1976).
79. Id. at 1262.
80. Only if defendants "were motivated by [good faith concern over medical care] can
their actions be deemed reasonable under the per se doctrine, if plaintiff has established
a prima facie per se case." Id. at 1263. This threshold inquiry focused primarily on intent;
the test was not entirely subjective, however, since the court imported the standard of a
reasonable man. Id. at 1270. See note 75 supra.
A variation of the approach taken in Feminist Vomen's Health Center was used in
Boddicker v. Arizona State Dental Ass'n, 549 F.2d 626 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 73
(1977). The plaintiffs challenged a state dental association rule requiring membership in
the American Dental Association as a precondition to membership in the state association.
In response to the plaintiffs' claim that the rule was illegal as a tying arrangement, the
court held that Goldfarb required that professional self-regulation "must serve the pur-
pose for which the profession exists, viz. to serve the public," to survive a Sherman Act
challenge. Id. at 632.
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tices. 81 A standard that turns on intent will require a detailed inquiry
into the history of the challenged practice and subjective testimony
on the purposes for which it was adopted.82 A standard that turns on
the "nature or character" of the challenged practice will include the
question of intent along with other perplexing factual issues.8 3 Either
version of the threshold inquiry would require courts to determine
many issues raised by full rule of reason analysis.8 4 Nor will it be the
exceptional case that will require the court to make this detailed in-
quiry. In the context of self-regulatory organizations, the defense that
a restraint serves the organization's noncommercial, rather than com-
mercial, objectives can almost always be raised. 85
81. See note 75 supra.
82. Indeed, any attempt to ascertain the "intent" of a complex organization may be
problematic since organizational decisionmaking processes are diverse and complex. See
Note, Decisionmaking Models and the Control of Corporate Crime, 85 YALE L.J. 1091,
1128 (1976). If subjective testimony is permitted, severe problems of credibility will arise,
since "it is in the very nature of such evidence that in the usual case it is not worthy of
credit." United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 567-68 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
concurring in result) (footnote omitted); see Brodley, Potential Competition Mergers: A
Structural Synthesis, 87 YALE L.J. 1, 54-55 (1977) (limitations of testimony based on sub-
jective intentions).
83. Courts have not clearly articulated the indicia of commerciality under the nature
and character version of the inquiry test, but the inquiry would appear to require a
detailed description of the setting in which the activity occurs with special emphasis on
any economic advantage the defendant acquires by virtue of the activity. Undoubtedly,
the defendant's purpose will also be an important criterion since evidence of intent "may
help the court to interpret facts and predict consequences." Chicago Board of Trade v.
United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
84. With the single, but important, exception of evidence of anticompetitive effect, the
rule of reason requires substantially the same type of evidence required by the commercial/
noncommercial standard:
The court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the
restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the
nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint,
the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose
or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a good inten-
tion will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because
knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict conse-
quences.
Id. at 238.
85. That this should be so clearly follows from the fact that such organizations, by
definition, seek to promote the social benefits of a given activity. See note I supra. A re-
view of the cases reveals that, in almost every one, the defendants could raise credible
evidence that the challenged practice was noncommercial. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar, 97
S. Ct. 2691, 2701-06 (1977) (restraint: ban on advertising by lawyers; asserted justifications:
necessity to promote sense of professional pride, legal advertising inherently misleading,
prevention of adverse effect on administration of justice, anticompetitive effects of ad-
vertising, increased consumer costs, and prevention of shoddy work); Marjorie Webster
Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges and Secondary Schools, 432 F.2d
650, 652-53, 657 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970) (restraint: refusal to accredit
proprietary schools; justifications: promoting atmosphere of academic inquiry, protecting
academic freedom, and institutional control of educational policy); Feminist Women's
Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, 415 F. Supp. 1258, 1264-67 (N.D. Fla. 1976) (restraint:
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Second, an attempt to distinguish commercial and noncommercial
restraints breaks down when applied to practices that contain both
commercial and noncommercial elements. A specific self-regulatory
practice will often have a dual effect or purpose. For example,
restricting entry to a profession can artificially inflate the price of
professional services as well as protect the public from incompetent
practitioners."" The mixed practice poses a troublesome dilemma. A
categorical solution, deeming the mixed restraint to be either com-
mercial or noncommercial, would require courts to adopt either im-
munity, broad application of per se rules, or a rule of reason ap-
proach.87 On the other hand, a series of ad hoc resolutions would
seriously undermine the certainty of the law.88 Neither alternative is
satisfactory.
The costs of making this difficult threshold inquiry might be justi-
fied if the inquiry promised to further the goals of antitrust policy. But
the inquiry does not promise to do so. It has long been clear in other
areas of antitrust law that a "good intention" cannot justify conduct
refusal to deal with physicians associating with plaintiff; justification: maintenance bf
adequate health care standards). If the NCAA faces an antitrust challenge, it too could
raise arguments that its activities are noncommercial.
86. It will often occur that restraints arising in the context of self-regulatory organ-
izations will be both commercial and noncommercial since, given that such organizations
purport to act in the public interest, any restraint being challenged under the antitrust
laws is presumably doing commercial harm. Even a cursory look at the NCAA reveals that
many of its practices are both commercial and noncommercial. Although NCAA limits on
student-athlete compensation, see pp. 658-60 supra, may protect the young from the cor-
rupting influences of large sums of money and allow students to choose their schools
according to educational quality rather than the size of offered athletic awards, the limita-
tions also have a commercial effect. By limiting the amount of money student athletes may
receive, NCAA member schools artifically reduce the costs of fielding a quality team.
Perhaps the clearest example of mixed purposes for adopting an anticompetitive practice
is the limitation on the number of coaches rule recently upheld as reasonable. Hennessey
v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, No. CA 76-P-0799-W (N.D. Ala. Sept. 27, 1976);
Board of Regents v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 561 P.2d 499 (Okla. 1977). The
restriction was commercial in its admitted purpose to reduce costs and to equalize re-
cruiting strength; however, the restriction also served to free athletic dollars for uses other
than recruitment, such as attaining the noncommercial objective of providing equal op-
portunity for female participation in college sports. Id. at 506-07.
87. First, the courts might deem all mixed restraints to be commercial and apply the
per se rules; this, however, would largely eliminate the commercial/noncommercial inquiry
in favor of the per se rules. Second, the court might deem such restraints to be non-
commercial and conclusively presume the restraint reasonable. This, however, would
allow much damaging anticompetitive activity to continue since it would tend to immunize
self-regulatory activity. Finally, the court might deem such restraints to be noncommercial
but adopt the approach taken in Veizaga. See note 77 supra. This would approximate
adoption of the approach taken in Hennessey, since the court would often apply the rule
of reason to self-regulatory activity. See pp. 667-68 supra.
88. See note 54 supra.
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that has an unreasonable anticompetitive effect.8 0 More important,
the commercial/noncommercial distinction has little foundation in
antitrust theory. Although the purpose of antitrust law is to promote
competition, a competitive economy is itself only a means of maximiz-
ing social welfare. 90 No reason has been advanced to show why the
noncommercial nature of a practice will make the practice more
likely to benefit society than a commercial practice.91 In Goldfarb the
Supreme Court insinuated that the noncommercial aspects of self-regu-
latory activity might justify deviations from traditional antitrust rules,0 2
but the Court did not limit the possible justifications for relaxed anti-
trust scrutiny to the noncommercial aspects of self-regulatory organiza-
tions.93
89. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105-06 .(1948). Under the rule of reason,
evidence of intent may be helpful in deciding the consequences of the defendant's conduct,
but it cannot justify conduct that suppresses competition. See Chicago Board of Trade v.
United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
90. Although there is considerable dispute among observers about what the goals of
antitrust ought to be, there is general agreement that the purpose of the antitrust laws
is to protect competition. Compare Bork, Contrasts in Antitrust Theory: 1, 65 COLUNm. L
R y. 401, 401-02 (1965) with Blake 8 Jones, Toward a Three-Dimensional Antitrust Policy,
65 CoLUM. L. REV. 422, 422-23 (1965). Disagreement centers on the meaning of the term
"competition," see Dewey, The Economic Thecry of Antitrust: Science or Religion?, 50
VA. L. REv. 413, 421-22 (1964), and on the values Congress intended to protect by protect-
ing competition. Compare Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9
J.L. & EcoN. 7 (1966) with Letwin, Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887-1890,
23 U. CH. L. REv. 221 (1956).
Observers agree that the ultimate end of a competitive economy is to maximize social
welfare. See, e.g., Blake & Jones, supra at 436; Bork, supra note 15, at 831. The ways in
which the Sherman Act advances social welfare are, however, in some dispute. The Act
has been interpreted as stating a legislative preference for a greater number of producers
of a smaller size. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962); United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945). A corollary of this
notion is the idea that the Sherman Act, by protecting a free enterprise economy, is an
economic "Magna Carta" designed to guarantee personal economic freedom. See United
States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). Furthermore, anticompetitive activity can
sometimes usurp governmental power. See Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v.
FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 465-66 (1941); Dewey, The New Learning: One Man's View, in IN-
DUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE Naw LEARNING 1, 11 (H. Goldschmid, H. Mann & J. Weston
eds. 1974). For a discussion of the role of equity considerations in antitrust policy, see
Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust: Other Than Competition and Efficiency, What Else
Counts?, 125 U. PA. L. Rav. 1191 (1977). It is difficult to see how these policy goals mandate
giving special consideration to noncommercial aspects of self-regulatory activity. Certainly,
neither these goals nor the goal of maximizing material wealth will help courts adopt
procedures for analyzing conduct that is both commercial and noncommercial. See p. 671
supra.
91. It is obvious that even pure profit maximizers can promote competition through
increased economic efficiency created by practices that may appear ostensibly anticom-
petitive. This was one of the rationales for ending the per se ban against vertical location
restrictions. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 97 S. Ct. 2549, 2559-61 (1977).
92. 421 U.S. at 788 n.17 (dictum) ("The public service aspect, and other features of the
professions, may require that a particular practice, which could properly be viewed as a
violation of the Sherman Act in another context, be treated differently.")
93. The Court used open-ended language ("other features of the professions") and
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III. Reconciling Recent and Traditional Antitrust Analysis:
A Proposed Approach
A. Proposal
Although the approaches taken by courts since Goldfarb are neither
workable nor justified by the policy of the Sherman Act,94 some re-
laxing of the per se rules is justified in the context of self-regulation. 95
Once it is found that the defendant is a self-regulatory association
engaging in a practice that would be per se illegal in an ordinary com-
mercial setting, courts should adopt a two-stage analysis. First, the
defendant should be permitted to show that the particular restraint
achieves a substantial, but not anticompetitive, objective for the bene-
fit of a broader class than the class being regulated. If the defendant
fails to do this, the practice should be held illegal with no further in-
quiry. If the defendant succeeds, the inquiry should proceed to the
second stage. In the second stage, the plaintiff should be permitted to
demonstrate that there are nearly as effective, but less competitively
harmful, means of achieving substantially the same objective. If the
plaintiff succeeds, the organization's conduct should be held illegal
without further inquiry. If the practice survives this two-stage review,
it should be held not to violate the Sherman Act.
The proposal is superior to using pure rule of reason analysis in a
self-regulatory context.9 6 The first stage of the proposed analysis con-
clusively presumes that any practice that is either entirely anticom-
petitive or is not related to the defendant's self-regulatory role is an
unreasonable restraint of trade. Thus the proposal identifies cases in
specifically witheld comment for later consideration. Id. The case for considering com-
mercial restraints is strong where isolating commercial from noncommercial conduct is
so difficult. See pp. 669-71 supra.
94. See pp. 667-72 supra.
95. See pp. 665-66 supra.
96. See pp. 667-68 supra (describing rule of reason approach taken in Hennessey).
Determining whether an organization is engaged in self-regulation requires only a fairly
simple inquiry. By examining an organization's constitution and bylaws, the concerns it
expresses when making rules and setting standards, the historical setting that prompted
formation of the organization, and the degree to which those who engage in the activity
are committed to a tradition of public service, it is possible to determine whether the
organization has a substantial interest in the noncommercial aspects of the conduct that it
regulates and a substantial interest in protecting the welfare of a class that is broader
than its membership. In fact, courts appear to determine whether a defendant should be
categorized as self-regulatory without detailed analysis. See, e.g., Boddicker v. Arizona State
Dental Ass'n, 549 F.2d 626, 630-32 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 73 (1977); Feminist
Women's Health Center v. Mohammad, 415 F. Supp. 1258, 1263 (N.D. Fla. 1976). The in-
quiry needed to determine whether the defendant organization should be categorized as
self-regulatory is far narrower than full rule of reason review.
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which further individual inquiry is not justified by the Supreme
Court's caveat in Goldfarb.97
If the defendant passes the first stage of analysis, the second stage
guarantees that the amount of competitive harm is minimized, since
the plaintiff has the opportunity to show that less harmful means of
achieving the legitimate objective are available. Moreover, if it ap-
pears that there is either no rational connection with a substantial ob-
jective for the benefit of a broader class or if there are less anticom-
petitive ways of achieving this objective, a court may legitimately re-
fuse to hear further evidence relevant to determining reasonableness.
The court is no longer required to engage in the unguided balancing
of broad social values required by full rule of reason review.98 The
defendant's self-regulatory role serves as a guideline for the exercise of
judicial discretion.99
The proposal's limited inquiry into the means-end rationality of
self-regulatory practices challenged under the antitrust laws both
avoids the problems of the commercial/noncommercial inquiry and
better accommodates the goals of antitrust law with the requirements
of private self-regulation. The proposed method eliminates the trouble-
some problem of deciding what courts should do if a particular prac-
tice has both commercial and noncommercial characteristics. Although
the proposed analysis will probably generate much of the same
evidence that the commercial/noncommercial inquiry generates, 100 it
focuses on whether the challenged practice produces substantial bene-
fits rather than on the relatively unimportant question of whether the
restraint is noncommercial.
The proposed analysis is also superior to applying per se rules to
self-regulatory organizations.' 01 Application of the per se rules in the
97. The "public service aspect, and other features of the professions" prompted the
Court's concern for relaxed antitrust standards. 421 U.S. at 788 n.17.
98. See p. 668 supra.
99. Some judicial weighing of broad social values seems inevitable in light of the
Supreme Court's suggestion in Goldfarb that the public service aspects of the professions
might justify anticompetitive conduct. See 421 U.S. at 788 n.17. One objection might be
that although the economist's tools provide courts with a means for measuring anticompeti-
tive effect, no such tools are available for measuring broader social values. Such criticism
totally ignores the role that other social sciences, especially political science and sociology,
and even the humanities, can play in antitrust litigation. See Sullivan, Economics and
More Humanistic Disciplines. What Are the Sources of Wisdom for Antitrust?, 125 U. PA.
L. Rav. 1214 (1977).
100. See p. 670 & note 84 supra. The proposal does eliminate the necessity of relying
on evidence of subjective intent. Such evidence might be admissible to help a court de-
termine the effect of the defendant's conduct, see note 83 supra, but the reliability of
such evidence is no longer crucial since an objective standard of means-end rationality
must be satisfied.
101. There is little authority for applying per se rules to self-regulatory organizations.
In a case decided on remand from the Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of
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self-regulatory context would destroy much legitimate and beneficial
activity. 102 The least restrictive means test, like the commercial/
noncommercial standard, reduces the certainty that an absolute per
se rule produces, but a loss of certainty is inherent in relaxing per se
rules in order to retain the benefits produced by self-regulatory activi-
ties. This loss of certainty is a price that many courts have been willing
to pay, even in a typical commercial setting, where there may be
commercial or broader social justifications for refusing rigidly to apply
per se rules.
103
B. The Proposal and the NCAA
The NCAA would be required to show justifications for its restric-
tive practices because these practices would be per se illegal in an
ordinary commercial context. Under this Note's analysis, the NCAA
could justify some, but not all, of its practices.
04
Goldfarb, a district court rejected a professional association's contention that its practices
should be judged under the rule of reason instead of the per se doctrine. United States v.
National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, 404 F. Supp. 457 (D.D.C. 1975), aff'd, 555 F.2d 978
(D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 51 (1977) (No. 76-1767). The court of appeals, while
approving the use of the per se rule, used an analysis resembling the standard proposed
by this Note. Although the court affirmed the application of the per se rule against price
fixing, it did so only after finding that "the rationalization offered by the Society does
not justify the broad ban on all competitive bidding which the Society has attempted to
enforce." 555 F.2d at 982. The court specifically noted the possibility that a narrowly
drawn ethical rule would better be examined under the rule of reason. Id. at 983. In
effect, the court determined that the rule against competitive bidding was overly restrictive.
102. See pp. 665-66 supra.
103. Courts are able to inject some degree of flexibility into per se analysis by taking
many factors into consideration when deciding whether to include a challenged activity
within a per se category. Compare United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,
222-23 (1940) (concerted buying program held per se violation of § 1) with Appalachian
Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 373 (1933) (exclusive selling agency held reason-
able despite tendency towards price stabilization).
104. Before the court reaches the question of substantive review, it may be faced with
an argument that the NCAA can claim the protection of the Parker v. Brown state action
doctrine. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). A substantial number of NCAA members
are state schools. See [1976-77] MANUAL OF THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC AssocIATION
148-76. In several suits between the NCAA and institutions and/or students, generally in-
volving eligibility determinations, when questions of equal protection or due process were
raised, the courts consistently found that the actions of the NCAA involved sufficient state
action to trigger Fourteenth Amendment review. See, e.g., Howard Univ. v. NCAA, 510 F.2d
213, 216-20 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Parish v. NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1975); Note, Judicial
Review of Disputes Between Athletes and the National Collegiate Athletic Association, 24
STAN. L. REV. 903, 916-21 (1972).
The Parker v. Brown state action doctrine is much narrower than the state action in-
volved in civil rights and other Fourteenth Amendment cases. Cantor v. Detroit Edison
Co., 428 U.S. 579, 590-91 (1976); see Verkuil, State Action, Due Process and Antitrust: Re-
flections on Parker v. Brown, 75 CoLust. L. REv. 328 (1975). Parker v. Brown is clearly
limited to official state action taken by state officials. 428 U.S. at 591. "The Court has
already decided that state authorization, approval, encouragement or participation in
restrictive private conduct confers no antitrust immunity." Id. at 592-93 (footnotes omitted).
"[A]nticompetitive activities must be compelled by direction of the State acting as a
sovereign." Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975).
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1. Limitations on Student-Athlete Compensation
Some limitation on student-athlete compensation is inherent in at-
taining the NCAA's fundamental goal of maintaining distinctively
amateur intercollegiate athletics. 105 Furthermore, some definition of
amateurism, it could be argued, is necessary to prevent the excessive
commercialism that can produce a "win at all costs" attitude that may
be detrimental to the educational development of student athletes. 10
The NCAA thus could pass the first stage of the analysis; its limitation
on student-athlete compensation achieves a substantial, but not anti-
competitive, objective that benefits students and the general public.
A requirement that regional athletic conferences adopt independent
standards might be a less restrictive means of accomplishing the
NCAA's goals. 1 7 Such a requirement would provide for some inter-
conference competition but would preserve the right of educational
institutions to set appropriate limits on student-athlete compensation.
In order for the NCAA compensation limits to satisfy the least restric-
tive means test, the NCAA would have to justify a nationwide defini-
tion of "amateur." The NCAA could persuasively argue that regional
compensation limits would break down through interconference com-
petition and that this would result in the type of excesses that a nation-
wide standard is designed to prevent. Having satisfied the second stage
of the analysis, the NCAA compensation limits would be conclusively
presumed reasonable and thus legal under the Sherman Act.
2. Restrictions on the Number of Coaches
The NCAA limitations on the number of coaches have twice been
challenged under the Sherman Act and have been found to satisfy the
rule of reason on both occasions. 0 8 The NCAA offered two justifica-
tions for the rule. First, it argued that athletically superior schools
105. See notes 9 & 58 supra.
106. Not only may such an attitude draw the student too far from his studies, but it
may expose the student to dishonest and unethical conduct. See Marco, The Place of
Intercollegiate Athletics in Higher Education, 31 J. HIGHER EDuc. 422, 426 (1960). Even
with the present limitations, it is questionable whether college athletes are being ade-
quately educated. In 1974 only about 62% of professional basketball players had received
their undergraduate degrees. J. Duaso, supra note 9, at 82. Limits on compensation, more-
over, encourage student-athletes to choose their college, at least in part, on the basis of
educational quality by reducing the economic element of the choice.
107. Some regional conferences do this to a degree, with the NCAA limitations serving
as a ceiling. For example, the Ivy League limits athletic-related financial aid to student
need. R. Atwell, supra note 12, at 15.
108. Hennessey v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, No. CA 76-P-0799-W (N.D. Ala.
Sept. 27, 1976); Board of Regents v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 561 P.2d 499
(Okla. 1977).
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were using their success to entrench themselves as "super powers." Be-
cause a successful football or basketball team generates prestige and
revenue required to recruit talented athletes, 1 9 short-term imbalances
in athletic strength were used to perpetuate athletic superiority to the
detriment of athletically weaker schools. Second, this detrimental effect
was especially severe in a time of inflationary costs. The competition to
keep up with these "super powers" was causing schools to increase ex-
penditures on profitable sports and thus to reduce athletic funds avail-
able for minor sports.1 0
These limitations would be declared illegal under this Note's pro-
posal. Assuming that the NCAA's arguments satisfied the first stage of
the proposal, both of these goals could have been substantially achieved
by either limiting total expenditures on certain sports or by limiting
the amount of recruiting that any coaching staff might engage in,
perhaps gauged according to previous athletic success."1
3. The NCAA Television Plan
The NCAA might offer two justifications in defense of its method
of selling television rights. First, NCAA control over broadcasting
allows the Association to retain control over the identity of sponsors in
order to protect the NCAA's name, the image of college sports, and the
reputation of the NCAA member schools. Second, the restraint on open
sale of television rights by member schools and the limits on television
exposure are intended to increase ticket sales and attendance at live
events." -2 The restraint is thus viewed as achieving the objective of
promoting competition in the ticket market. 1 3 Increasing attendance
might also be viewed as promoting school spirit and wider institutional
support." 4
109. See note 12 supra.
110. Hennessey v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, No. CA 76-P-0799-W, slip op. at
23 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 27, 1976).
Ill. But cf. id. at 25 (not clear that there were less restrictive ways of accomplishing
NCAA objectives; however, the court appears only to have considered limit on coaches'
salary rather than number of coaches).
112. NCAA, supra note 30, at 8. Adoption of the NCAA television plan was prompted
by the belief that unrestricted televising of football games was harming attendance
figures. Hochberg & Horowitz, supra note 30, at 113-15. This harmful effect was eliminated
by preventing schools with a strong regional following from telecasting its games region-
ally every weekend. The theory was that although a strong school could fill its stadium
every week despite the fact that the game might be televised in a home region, a weaker
school might not be able to pull fans away from their television sets, which were display-
ing superior quality football with no admission charge. Id.
113. Cf. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 97 S. Ct. 2549, 2559-61 (1977)
(increased interbrand competition may justify restraint on intrabrand competition).
114. See ACE STUDY, supra note 4, at 117.
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The first justification would not satisfy the initial stage of the
proposal because, assuming the objective to be a substantial and not
anticompetitive objective, it does not work to the benefit of anyone
other than members of the NCAA.'1 5 The second justification satisfies
the proposal's first stage if the television plan is viewed as benefiting
the nation's sports consumers by working to achieve an optimal mix of
live and televised football games. 116 Moreover, there are no less restric-
tive means of accomplishing this end. Dividing the nation into several
regional television markets administered by regional athletic associa-
tions would either fail to create competition in the sale of television
rights to the television industry or would impair the member schools'
ability to use concerted action to achieve an optimal mix of live and
televised games within any given region." 7 The NCAA television plan
would not be held to violate the Sherman Act since it satisfies both
stages of the proposal.
4. The NCAA Enforcement Program
Once it is admitted that some nationwide rules for the conduct of
intercollegiate sports are desirable,"18 the organization that makes these
rules must be permitted to secure compliance."19 If a concerted refusal
to deal is being used to secure compliance with an NCAA rule that
itself satisfies the first stage of the analysis, the first part of the pro-
posed method of review will be satisfied-that is, the restrictive prac-
tice is being used to accomplish some legitimate end. It is also clear
that, on some occasions, this sanction will be the least expensive and
most effective means of securing compliance with these legitimate
115. Even if this justification could satisfy the first stage, less restrictive means of
accomplishing this objective are readily available to the NCAA-for example, the use of
tightly drafted NCAA rules. An example of such a regulation is the NCAA ban on
advertising "alcoholic beverages (except malt beverages and wine), political organizations,
feminine hygiene products, and professional sports organizations or personnel" during
the televising of NCAA championships. ExEcunvE REGULATIONS OF THE NATIONAL COL-
LEGIATE ATHLETIC AssoCIATION, Regulation 2, § 16(a), reprinted in [1977-78] MANUAL OF
THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSocIATION 99.
116. Thus by maximizing the revenue produced by college sports through both the
sale of television rights and tickets for live football, the NCAA plan might be viewed as
optimally allocating football between advertisers and sports fans. Competition between
live and telecast football would be imperfect at best, since the ultimate consumers of
televised football, the viewers, do not pay for the privilege of viewing.
117. Creating a number of exclusive regional plans would not create competition among
regions since the market would be geographically segmented. Competing plans within a
region would tend toward eliminating the allocative control of the plans.
118. This has been demonstrated with respect to limits on student-athlete compensa-
tion. See p. 676 supra.
119. See Molinas v. National Basketball Ass'n, 190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
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rules. Thus, the use of boycotting tactics is permitted under this Note's
proposal if such tactics are used to enforce an NCAA practice that does
not itself violate the proposal.
Conclusion
Nowhere in Goldfarb did the Supreme Court explicitly label the
defendants' fee-setting activity a per se violation. Whether this omis-
sion was intentional is unclear; however, once it is decided that criteria
other than effect on competition are of importance to the antitrust
liability of self-regulatory activities-a suggestion made in Goldfarb-
the need for a method of meshing antitrust's per se rules with private
self-regulation arises. By forcing members of self-regulatory organiza-
tions to achieve the objectives of their activities while causing only
such competitive harm as is necessary to achieve these objectives, the
proposal of this Note harmonizes the goals of antitrust with the bene-
ficial features of private self-regulation.
